“Love Thy Neighbor”—Evolving Geopolitics of West Asia

There is an old saying in the Arab world, “choose your neighbor before the house.” A bad neighbor can be a misfortune; a good one, a blessing. Unfortunately, in geopolitics, you do not get to make this choice.

You do not get to choose your neighbor. You just have to find a way to live with them. Fight when the need arises, ,and compromise when possible. In West Asia, two powerful neighbors are trying this. Iran and Saudi Arabia for decades have fought each other for dominance and influence in the region.

They waged proxy wars, but now they are trying to bury the hatchet. Last week, three Iranian diplomats arrived in Saudi Arabia to take back posts at the OIC. This followed five rounds of cordial, practical and positive talks between the two sides.

A major geopolitical churn is underway in West Asia. The question is what is driving this thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia. What is it that brought them to the negotiating table? Why were they fighting in the first place? Is their rivalry religious or political or both? How did this impact West Asia, and how will this change the region?

The roots of Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran are often sought in a 1000-year-old religious schism—a schism between Sunnis and Shias—the two main branches of Islam. Iran and Saudi Arabia are on the opposing side of the split.

In the Seventeenth Century, the Safavid Dynasty transformed Iran into a bastion of Shia Islam. In the Eighteenth Century, the House of Saud embraced an ultra-conservative version of Sunni Islam. This marked the onset of their sectarian rivalry.

Despite the split, Saudi Arabia and Iran share fundamental beliefs, and they have co-existed for centuries. There have been periods when the two powers have cooperated with each other. During the Cold War, the two countries worked together to help the United States establish a solid front against the Soviet Union. They collaborated to contain Moscow’s expansion in the Gulf.

When the Egyptian Army intervened in the Yemen war, Iran and Saudi Arabia came together to back Yemen Shia monarch. They were called American twin pillars for regional security. They shared good relations and diplomatic ties probably because they were both governed by western-backed monarchs.

By 1978, Reza Pahalvi,  the Shah of Iran, and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia had reached the zenith of their power. They maintained cordial ties and launched joint programs to modernize their countries.

Unfortunately, this bonhomie did not last long and one year later, in the year 1979, everything changed. Iran witnessed a revolution in 1979 by Shia militias backed by Ayatollah Khamenei.

They toppled the regime of the Shah. They took Iran from being a secular nation to a new kind of revolutionary theocracy. Iran started exporting its model and beliefs across its borders. The Ayatollah called upon Muslims to overthrow American-backed Arab rulers.

The same year, 1979, there was a transition in Saudi Arabia too that sent the kingdom down the path of conservatism. The Grand Mosque in Mecca was attacked by radical Islamists.

The attack took Saudi Arabia from modernity to desert tribalism. The House of  Saud took refuge in Wahabbism to cement its authority. It renewed ties with Sunni Wahabi clerics and began exporting its beliefs to build influence.

After 1979, both the countries started drifting apart and set out on a quest of building influence. They had the resources to do so. They also had a common weakness-religious ethnic minority in their oil-rich provinces.

In Saudi Arabia, the eastern province had a significant Shia population. It also had most of the kingdom’s oil reserves. The Saudi monarchy felt threatened by the unrest there. It started exerting control over the Shias and limiting their links to Iran.

Similarly, Iran too had a significant Sunni population living in the Kuzhestan province which house almost 80% of Iran’s on-shore oil reserves. Fearing an ethno-religious upheaval, it started cracking down on Sunni Muslims. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia fueled the “us versus them” rhetoric. They used the sectarian rift as a political construct to rule at home and to dictate agendas in the neighborhood.

The 2011 Arab Spring intensified this rivalry further. There were political revolutions across West Asia and Africa. Crisis erupted in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. This resulted in a power vacuum, which was immediately exploited by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both began racing to fill this void.

They supported uprisings in states they were not close to, and opposed rebellions in states they considered allies. In Bahrain, Iran supported anti-government protests in the name of the will of the people. Saudi Arabia did the opposite. It dispatched its army to help Bahrain’s monarchy. In Syria, Saudi Arabia backed the rebels.

It provides them generous military and financial assistance. Iran does the opposite. It supports the Assad regime in fighting rebel groups backed by Riyadh. In Lebanon, Iran supports the Hezbollah, a Shia militant group. With Iran’s support, Hezbollah controls a huge and heavily armed fighting force. Saudi Arabia has for the longest time supported the Lebanese government in taking on the Hezbollah.

In Yemen, Iran supports the Houthi rebels, a Shia militia group fighting the regime. Saudi Arabia helps the regime strike the Houthis. Militant group Hamas has been a close ally of Iran. Teheran helps the group fight for the Palestinian cause. Officially, Saudi Arabia does not support Israel but the two are said to have formed a covert alliance with joint interest of countering Iran.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is reflected all over West Asia. In the pro-Saudi camp are the Sunni states like UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt. In the Iranian camp are the states of Iraq and Syria. Split between their power play are Yemen, Lebanon and Qatar. The religious fragmentation in these states, the religious divisions between the Shias and Sunnis, feeds the Saudi-Iran rivalry.

Things became worse when Saudi Arabia executed Shia cleric Nimr-Al-Nimr in 2016. He was highly critical of the Saudi monarchy and was vocal about holding elections in the country. Saudi Arabia saw Iran’s hand in this and sentenced him to death. This was seen as oppression of the Shias by the Sunnis.

Shia protesters in Iran set fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran. What followed was an immediate suspension of all ties. Bilateral relations became all but non-existent. Saudi Arabia and Iran stopped engaging each other. They stopped doing business and trade. They stopped playing with each other.

Now, there has been a thaw triggered by withdrawal of America from the region. Another reason is the losing charm of oil. The future of petro-dollar looks bleak. It is a mixture of politics and economic that has forced Riyadh and Teheran to seek a compromise. Iran’s reasons are largely economic.

US sanctions are crushing its economy. Restoring ties with the second largest economy in West Asia will help Iran broaden regional trade. Crown prince MBS is trying to diversify the economy and for that he needs to change his country’s image.

A de-escalation with Iran could spell an end to its proxy wars and also bring in investments that is sorely needed to transform Saudi Arabia by 2030. So, at the end of the day, this warming up of ties is more about money than anything else. It will not end the conflict but bring about a modicum of peace. Anything is better than war.

There is an old saying in the Arab world, “choose your neighbor before the house.” A bad neighbor can be a misfortune; a good one, a blessing. Unfortunately, in geopolitics, you do not get to make this choice. You do not get to choose your neighbor. You just have to find a way to live with them.

Fight when the need arises, ,and compromise when possible. In West Asia, two powerful neighbors are trying this. Iran and Saudi Arabia for decades have fought each other for dominance and influence in the region.

They waged proxy wars, but now they are trying to bury the hatchet. Last week, three Iranian diplomats arrived in Saudi Arabia to take back posts at the OIC. This followed five rounds of cordial, practical and positive talks between the two sides.

A major geopolitical churn is underway in West Asia. The question is what is driving this thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia. What is it that brought them to the negotiating table? Why were they fighting in the first place?

Is their rivalry religious or political or both? How did this impact West Asia, and how will this change the region? The roots of Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran are often sought in a 1000-year-old religious schism—a schism between Sunnis and Shias—the two main branches of Islam. Iran and Saudi Arabia are on the opposing side of the split.

In the Seventeenth Century, the Safavid Dynasty transformed Iran into a bastion of Shia Islam. In the Eighteenth Century, the House of Saud embraced an ultra-conservative version of Sunni Islam.

This marked the onset of their sectarian rivalry. Despite the split, Saudi Arabia and Iran share fundamental beliefs, and they have co-existed for centuries. There have been periods when the two powers have cooperated with each other.

During the Cold War, the two countries worked together to help the United States establish a solid front against the Soviet Union. They collaborated to contain Moscow’s expansion in the Gulf. When the Egyptian Army intervened in the Yemen war, Iran and Saudi Arabia came together to back Yemen Shia monarch.

They were called American twin pillars for regional security. They shared good relations and diplomatic ties probably because they were both governed by western-backed monarchs. By 1978, Reza Pahalvi,  the Shah of Iran, and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia had reached the zenith of their power. They maintained cordial ties and launched joint programs to modernize their countries.

Unfortunately, this bonhomie did not last long and one year later, in the year 1979, everything changed. Iran witnessed a revolution in 1979 by Shia militias backed by Ayatollah Khamenei.

They toppled the regime of the Shah. They took Iran from being a secular nation to a new kind of revolutionary theocracy. Iran started exporting its model and beliefs across its borders. The Ayatollah called upon Muslims to overthrow American-backed Arab rulers.

The same year, 1979, there was a transition in Saudi Arabia too that sent the kingdom down the path of conservatism. The Grand Mosque in Mecca was attacked by radical Islamists.

The attack took Saudi Arabia from modernity to desert tribalism. The House of  Saud took refuge in Wahabbism to cement its authority. It renewed ties with Sunni Wahabi clerics and began exporting its beliefs to build influence.

After 1979, both the countries started drifting apart and set out on a quest of building influence. They had the resources to do so. They also had a common weakness-religious ethnic minority in their oil-rich provinces.

In Saudi Arabia, the eastern province had a significant Shia population. It also had most of the kingdom’s oil reserves. The Saudi monarchy felt threatened by the unrest there. It started exerting control over the Shias and limiting their links to Iran.

Similarly, Iran too had a significant Sunni population living in the Kuzhestan province which house almost 80% of Iran’s on-shore oil reserves. Fearing an ethno-religious upheaval, it started cracking down on Sunni Muslims.

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia fueled the “us versus them” rhetoric. They used the sectarian rift as a political construct to rule at home and to dictate agendas in the neighborhood.

The 2011 Arab Spring intensified this rivalry further. There were political revolutions across West Asia and Africa. Crisis erupted in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. This resulted in a power vacuum, which was immediately exploited by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both began racing to fill this void.

They supported uprisings in states they were not close to, and opposed rebellions in states they considered allies. In Bahrain, Iran supported anti-government protests in the name of the will of the people. Saudi Arabia did the opposite. It dispatched its army to help Bahrain’s monarchy. In Syria, Saudi Arabia backed the rebels. It provides them generous military and financial assistance. Iran does the opposite.

It supports the Assad regime in fighting rebel groups backed by Riyadh. In Lebanon, Iran supports the Hezbollah, a Shia militant group. With Iran’s support, Hezbollah controls a huge and heavily armed fighting force. Saudi Arabia has for the longest time supported the Lebanese government in taking on the Hezbollah.

In Yemen, Iran supports the Houthi rebels, a Shia militia group fighting the regime. Saudi Arabia helps the regime strike the Houthis. Militant group Hamas has been a close ally of Iran. Teheran helps the group fight for the Palestinian cause. Officially, Saudi Arabia does not support Israel but the two are said to have formed a covert alliance with joint interest of countering Iran.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is reflected all over West Asia. In the pro-Saudi camp are the Sunni states like UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt. In the Iranian camp are the states of Iraq and Syria. Split between their power play are Yemen, Lebanon and Qatar. The religious fragmentation in these states, the religious divisions between the Shias and Sunnis, feeds the Saudi-Iran rivalry.

Things became worse when Saudi Arabia executed Shia cleric Nimr-Al-Nimr in 2016. He was highly critical of the Saudi monarchy and was vocal about holding elections in the country. Saudi Arabia saw Iran’s hand in this and sentenced him to death. This was seen as oppression of the Shias by the Sunnis.

Shia protesters in Iran set fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran. What followed was an immediate suspension of all ties. Bilateral relations became all but non-existent. Saudi Arabia and Iran stopped engaging each other. They stopped doing business and trade. They stopped playing with each other.

Now, there has been a thaw triggered by withdrawal of America from the region. Another reason is the losing charm of oil. The future of petro-dollar looks bleak. It is a mixture of politics and economic that has forced Riyadh and Teheran to seek a compromise.

Iran’s reasons are largely economic. US sanctions are crushing its economy. Restoring ties with the second largest economy in West Asia will help Iran broaden regional trade. Crown prince MBS is trying to diversify the economy and for that he needs to change his country’s image.

A de-escalation with Iran could spell an end to its proxy wars and also bring in investments that is sorely needed to transform Saudi Arabia by 2030. So, at the end of the day, this warming up of ties is more about money than anything else. It will not end the conflict but bring about a modicum of peace. Anything is better than war.

edited and proofread by nikita sharma